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Abstract
This Article focuses on the evolving debates concerning jointly implemented forest and forestry
activities. More specifically, this Article focuses on forest and forestry activities under the Clean
Development Mechanism (”CDM”). The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (”Kyoto Protocol”) effectively created the project-based flexibility
mechanisms that would allow for joint implementation of policies and measures under the climate
change legal regime. Article 6 envisioned joint implementation (between developed countries and
economies in transition), and Article 12 envisioned the CDM (between developed and developing
countries). The overall objective of this Article is to identify the current political, policy, legal, and
technical challenges inherent in forest and forestry activities under the CDM; provide an assess-
ment of likely trends for upcoming commitment periods; and, finally, propose viable solutions for
overcoming future obstacles that currently prevent further developments in this area of the CDM.
This Article is divided into four sections. The first section will explain how forest and forestry
practices were introduced into the climate change legal regime; the science supporting such in-
clusion; and the different definitions, legal standings, and possible approaches to dealing with
the issues envisioned by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the decisions of the Conferences
of the Parties and Meetings of the Parties. The second section distills the legal and institutional
framework specific to forest and forestry activities under the CDM from the more complex and
comprehensive climate change legal regime. The third section identifies the current challenges
facing forest and forestry activities under the CDM. The fourth section provides possible solutions
for overcoming those challenges in view of upcoming commitment periods.
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INTRODUCTION
The direct and formal relationship between unsustainable
forestry practices and global climate change goes back at least to
the late 1970s. Since the Declaration of the World Climate Con-
ference in 1979, the international community has acknowledged
that deforestation and changes in land use, such as agricultural
and pastoral practices, are contributing to the increased amount
of carbon dioxide ("C0 2") in the atmosphere.' In 1989, the
Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic
Change recognized a growing international preoccupation with
the alteration of the composition of the Earth's atmosphere due
to anthropogenic activities; 2 stressed the importance of sustaina-
ble forestry, reforestation, afforestation, and conservation activi-
* Researcher at the Getulio Vargas Foundation School of Law in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil (GV Direito Rio), Adjunct Professor and doctoral (S.J.D.) candidate, Pace Uni-
versity School of Law; LL.B. and LL.M., Pontific Catholic University of Parana School of
Law (Brazil); LL.M., Pace University School of Law. My thanks to the Brazilian Coordi-
nation for Improvement of Higher Education Personnel ("CAPES") and Pace Univer-
sity School of Law (Feldschuh Scholarship) for making this research possible, to Profes-
sors Jeff Miller and Nicholas Robinson, and to David N. Cassuto and Mark R. Shulman
for their comments and suggestions.
1. See World Climate Conference, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 12-23, 1979, Declaration of the
World Climate Conference, at 2, U.N. Doc IOC/SAB-IV/INF.3 ("[W]e can say with some
confidence that the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes of land use have
increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by about 15 percent during
the last century and it is at present increasing by about 0.4 percent per year.").
2. See The Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change,
Noordwijk, Neth., Nov. 7, 1989, The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and
Climatic Change, 1-3, reprinted in Selected International Legal Materials on Global Warming
and Climate Change, 5 Am. U.J. IN-r'L L. & POL'Y 513, 592-601 (1990).
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ties;3 and called for a global increase in net forest growth of
12,000,000 hectares per year in the beginning of the twenty-first
century.4 Shortly after the first assessment report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), the Second
World Climate Conference, held in Geneva from October 29th
to November 7th, 1990, called upon the international commu-
nity to take measures to increase "sinks" of greenhouse gases.5
This was the situation with respect to forests and forestry
leading up to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), which is the formal and fun-
damental pillar of the current climate change legal regime. In
addition to general norms and principles, the UNFCCC laid the
ground for developed countries, based on the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibility, to adopt in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol, binding commitments envisioning reductions and limi-
tations on the emission of greenhouse gases. To mitigate the
adverse impacts of commitments to limiting and reducing emis-
sions, the UNFCCC allowed the parties to implement policies
and measures domestically and/or jointly.
This Article focuses on the evolving debates concerning
jointly implemented forest and forestry activities. More specifi-
cally, this Article focuses on forest and forestry activities under
the Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM"). The 1997 Kyoto
Protocol to the UNFCCC ("Kyoto Protocol") effectively created
the project-based flexibility mechanisms that would allow for
joint implementation of policies and measures under the cli-
mate change legal regime. Article 6 envisioned joint implemen-
tation (between developed countries and economies in transi-
tion), and Article 12 envisioned the CDM (between developed
and developing countries). The overall objective of this Article
is to identify the current political, policy, legal, and technical
challenges inherent in forest and forestry activities under the
CDM; provide an assessment of likely trends for upcoming com-
mitment periods; and, finally, propose viable solutions for over-
coming future obstacles that currently prevent further develop-
ments in this area of the CDM.
3. See id. 9.
4. See id. 21.
5. See Climate Change Fact Sheet 221, http://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/sene-
gal/fact/fs221.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
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This Article is divided into four sections. The first section
will explain how forest and forestry practices were introduced
into the climate change legal regime; the science supporting
such inclusion; and the different definitions, legal standings,
and possible approaches to dealing with the issues envisioned by
the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the decisions of the Con-
ferences of the Parties and Meetings of the Parties. The second
section distills the legal and institutional framework specific to
forest and forestry activities under the CDM from the more com-
plex and comprehensive climate change legal regime. The third
section identifies the current challenges facing forest and for-
estry activities under the CDM. The fourth section provides pos-
sible solutions for overcoming those challenges in view of up-
coming commitment periods.
I. THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREST AND FORESTRY
ACTIVITIES INTO THE CLIMATE
CHANGE LEGAL REGIME
The UNFCCC, the formal and fundamental multilateral in-
ternational agreement in the climate change legal regime, was
adopted in New York on May 9th, 1992, and fully launched dur-
ing the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, often called "The Earth
Summit."6 The UNFCCC expressly recognizes the role and im-
portance of "sinks" and "reservoirs" of greenhouse gases in miti-
gating global warming.7
According to the UNFCCC's handbook, "[a] sink is a pro-
cess, activity or mechanism that removes [greenhouse gases]
from the atmosphere; a reservoir is part of the climate system
that enables a [greenhouse gas] to be stored."8 The characteri-
zation of forestry and forest activities as types of sinks and reser-
voirs of CO 2 was established by scientific studies9 that, in turn,
6. See CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE ("UNFCCC"), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
HANDBOOK 19 (2006), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/hand-
book.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC HANDBOOK].
7. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, pmbl., May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
8. UNFCCC HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 24.
9. See SEBASTIAN OBERTHOR & HERMANN E. Orr, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNA-
TIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9, 131-32 (1999) (describing the science
underpinning the relationship between forests and CO 2 in the atmosphere).
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inspired the climate change legal regime.' Although the
UNFCCC makes some general references to promoting the en-
hancement of forests, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse
gases," the term "forestry" appears only once in the UNFCCC, 12
and no legal definition is provided. 3
A. The Science Linking Forest and Forestry Activities to the Climate
Change Legal Regime: "Sinks, " "Reservoirs"
and "Sources" of C02
Of the six greenhouse gases recognized by the climate
change legal regime,' 4 CO 2 is the most important. 5 Indeed,
CO 2 is the parameter for measuring other greenhouse gas emis-
sions." The relationship between forests and CO 2 in the atmos-
phere is characterized by forests' ability to absorb CO 2, store
CO 2, and offset other greenhouse gas emissions.'
7
Growing forests and plants, through photosynthesis, have
enormous carbon sequestration capabilities. Long established
old-growth and mature forests can store significant amounts of
carbon for long periods of time.' s Nonetheless, when disturbed,
10. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4(1) (d) (setting forth biomass, forests, oceans,
and other terrestrial, coastal, and marine ecosystems as examples of sinks and reservoirs
of greenhouse gases).
11. See, e.g., id.
12. See id. art. 4(1)(c).
13. See Imke Sagemfiller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity?, 31 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 189, 201 (2006) (explaining that "[a]s a framework convention, the UNFCCC
includes only few broad references to the removal of [greenhouse gases] by sinks").
14. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Annex A, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (listing
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N 20), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF 6) as greenhouse
gases).
15. See S. Brown et al., Issues and Challenges for Forest-Based Carbon-Offset Projects: A
Case Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia, 5 MITIGATION ADAPTATION
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 99, 99 (2000).
16. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5(3); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 599 (2d ed. 2002) ("Not all greenhouse gases
are created equal; different gases have different 'global warming potentials' ("GWPs").
The technical definition of global warming potentials is the cumulative radiative forc-
ing between the present and some chosen time horizon caused by a unit mass of gas
emitted now, expressed relative to that for some reference gas, typically CO.").
17. See Pedro Moura Costa & Charlie Wilson, An Equivalence Factor Between C02
Avoided Emissions and Sequestration-Description and Applications in Forestry, 5 MITIGATION
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 51, 51 (2000).
18. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), IPCC SPECIAL
2008]
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forests no longer play a role in mitigating global warming;
rather, they become part of the problem because they turn into
a considerable source of CO 2.19 Forests will act as sources of CO 2
when the ecosystem's capacity to uptake carbon is limited; when
the rate of photosynthesis no longer rises with the concentration
of CO 2; or when anthropogenic or natural factors cause ecosys-
tem degradation. 2' According to the UNFCCC, a "source" is
"any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aero-
sol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.
2
'
In a reflection of this common scientific understanding, the
UNFCCC embraced the role of forest conservation practices and
called upon all parties to promote, and cooperate in the en-
hancement of sinks and reservoirs22 while respecting the princi-
ple of common but differentiated responsibility. 23
B. The Legal Status of Forests and Forestry Activities in the
Climate Change Legal Regime
The definitions relevant to the legal status of forests and for-
estry that gave legal support for activities under the climate
change legal regime experienced two distinct phases. The first
REPORT: LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF")-SuMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 4 (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srulucf-e.pdf [hereinafter
IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF] ("Newly planted or regenerating forests, in the
absence of major disturbances, will continue to uptake carbon for 20 to 50 years or
more after establishment, depending on species and site conditions, though quantita-
tive projections beyond a few decades are uncertain."); Hawk Jia, Old-Growth Forests are
"Key Carbon Sinks", ScIDEv.NET, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.scidev.net/content/news/
eng/old-growth-forests-are-key-carbon-sinks.cfm (citing a recent study showing that a
400-year-old forest in southern China soaks up carbon significantly faster than ex-
pected).
19. See KENNETH L. ROSENBAUM ET AL., FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE
U.N., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FOREST FACTORS: POSSIBLE NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 2 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5647e/y5647e
00.pdf ("Actively growing trees and other plants capture CO 2 from the atmosphere,
combine it with water through photosynthesis and create sugars and more stable carbo-
hydrates. They may store a significant part of the carbon absorbed for appreciable
lengths of time, from years to millennia .... Eventually, when plants and animals die,
CO 2 returns to the atmosphere. When wood products and other organic materials
burn or decompose, they also release CO 2.").
20. See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 4.
21. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 1(9).
22. See id. art. 4(1)(d).
23. See id. art. 3(1). See generally PHILIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVi-
RONMENTAL LAw 285-89 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing, in detail, the principle of common
but differentiated responsibility).
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phase was characterized by the generic concepts of sink, reser-
voir, and source provided by the UNFCCC. The second phase is
characterized by the more precise and specific notions of these
terms provided by the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Confer-
ences and Meetings of the Parties. 4
1. The Legal Status of Forests and Forestry Activities
under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC's broad definitions for the terms sink,25 reser-
voir,2 6 and source 27 subsumed the concepts of forest and for-
estry; and as a result, they supported forestry project activities
during the Activities Implemented Jointly ("AIJ") Pilot Phase. 21
The primary concern during the negotiations at the first session
of the Conference of the Parties ("COP-I") in 1995 and the two
subsequent sessions of the Conference of the Parties in 1996 and
1997 ("COP-2" and "COP-3," respectively) was defining quanti-
fied emissions reductions and limitations for developed coun-
tries.2 9 Forest and forestry activities were primarily a cost-effec-
tive way to make emissions reductions and limitations commit-
24. For a discussion of the importance of developing clear definitions for terms
such as "forests," "afforestation," "reforestation," and "deforestation," see Robert T.
Watson & DavidJ. Verardo, Preface to IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18.
25. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 1(8) ("'Sink' means any process, activity or
mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse
gas from the atmosphere.").
26. See id. art. 1(7) ("'Reservoir' means a component or components of the cli-
mate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of greenhouse gas is stored.").
27. See id. art. 1 (9) (" 'Source' means any process or activity which releases a green-
house gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.").
28. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Berlin, F.R.G., Mar. 28-
Apr. 7, 1995, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session-Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5/CP.1, 1 (b), U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995) [hereinafter COP-1 Report-Part Two]
("[A]ctivities implemented jointly should be compatible with and supportive of na-
tional environment and development priorities and strategies, contribute to cost-effec-
tiveness in achieving global benefits and could be conducted in a comprehensive man-
ner covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases . . ").
29. See Dean Anderson, Rapporteur's Report of Workshop Presentations and Discussions,
in THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCTURES AND OP-
TIONS AFTER BERLIN 7, 7 (Michael Grubb & Dean Anderson eds., 1995) (stating that the
Berlin Mandate, which refers to the outcome of the first session of the Conference of
the Parties, "calls for a process to begin to strengthen commitments beyond 2000. This
process should lead the industrialized world to 'elaborate policies and measures,' and
to 'set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such
as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions.' Negotiations are to be
completed by early 1997 in order that the results can be adopted at 'COP-3' .... The
6392008]
640 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.31:634
ments feasible in the short term;3" and as a result, they became
an important negotiating tool for the imposition of cap commit-
ments upon developed countries.31
It was only during the fourth session of the Conference of
the Parties ("COP-4"), which occurred almost seven years after
the UNFCCC was promulgated, that a more specific legal regime
for land-use, land-use change, and forestry ("LULUCF") began
to emerge. 2
Legally, though, at least until the Kyoto Protocol, Article
4(1) (d) of the UNFCCC provided the formal connection be-
tween forests and forestry and sinks and reservoirs. This provi-
sion called on all Parties to promote the enhancement of sinks
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests.,
On the one hand, such broad definitions allowed the legal
status of forestry and forests to be easily inferred. Forests could
be equated to sinks and reservoirs. On the other hand, because
forests can also emit CO 2 when disturbed, they could also be
deemed sources of greenhouse gases under the UNFCCC.33
For practical purposes, this means that whenever the cli-
mate change legal regime refers to enhancement, promotion,
and sustainable management of sinks and reservoirs, and calls
for action to address anthropogenic emissions by sources, it is
including forests and forestry activities.3 4 This is important be-
cause the broadness of the definitions relating to forests and for-
expectation is that a protocol or other legal agreement will be negotiated at COP-3
defining emission constraints for Annex I Parties potentially up to the year 2020.").
30. See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change: Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATE-
GIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 57, 60 (1997) (noting that "there are low-cost opportunities
for carbon storage in the forestry sector").
31. See id. at 58 (stating that "to expect Annex I countries to implement too large a
share of the emission reductions could be physically or technically infeasible and would
likely be inefficient").
32. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Buenos Aires, Arg., Nov. 2-
14, 1998, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session-Part Two: Action Taken
by the Conference of the Parties at its Fourth Session, Decision 9/CP.4, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/
1998/16/Add.1 Uan. 25, 1999) (addressing LULUCF specifically).
33. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 1(9) ("'Source' means any process or activity
which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the
atmosphere."); Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of
the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, CoLo. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y,
2000 Yearbook, at 201, 207 ("Forests can be sources, sinks, or reservoirs of [greenhouse
gases].").
34. See generally OBERTHOR & OTT, supra note 9, at 131-32 (discussing the term
SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREATIES
estry in the period leading up to the Kyoto Protocol was condu-
cive to there being no limitation on the activities that could be
implemented under the AIJ Pilot Phase. 5 For this reason, forest
and forestry project activities during the AIJ Pilot Phase included
afforestation, reforestation, conservation practices, and sustaina-
ble forest management.36
2. The Legal Status of Forests and Forestry Activities under
the Kyoto Protocol and Subsequent Sessions of the
Conference and Meeting of the Parties
After the Kyoto Protocol expressly embraced forest and for-
estry practices and narrowed the UNFCCC's broad definitions of
sinks, reservoirs, and sources of CO2 , negotiators faced the
need to create a specific legal regime that could reconcile the
interests of parties supporting such activities with the interests of
parties opposing them.3" With the scientific support provided by
the IPCC39  and the Food and Agriculture Organization
("FAO"),4" and the technical expertise of the Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technological Advice ("SBSTA"),4' negotiators
"sink" and highlighting that "[i]n general, forests have the highest sink potential, de-
pending, however, on age and condition of the forest").
35. See COP-i Report-Part Two, supra note 28, Decision 5/CP.1, 1(b) (deciding
that activities implemented jointly "could be conducted in a comprehensive manner
covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases").
36. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Geneva, Switz., Jul. 8-19,
1996, Review of the Implementation of the Convention and of Decisions of the First Session of the
Conference of the Parties-Activities Implemented Jointly: Annual Review of Progress Under the
Pilot Phase, 1 13, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1996/14 (June 4, 1996) (reporting that there are
five ongoing projects in forest preservation, restoration, or reforestation and four in
afforestation).
37. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3(3)-(4).
38. See FARHANA YAMIN &JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 123 (2004) ("The technical
complexity, and high political stakes, of sinks issues contributed significantly to the
breakdown of negotiations at The Hague at COP-6 part I."),
39. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, The Hague, Neth., Nov.
13-25, 2000, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the First Part of its Sixth Session-Part
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at the First Part of its Sixth Session, Decision
1/CP.6 Annex, Note by the President of the Conference of the Parties at its sixth ses-
sion, dated 23 November 2000, Box C, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2 (Apr. 4,
2001) ("Parties decide that for defining afforestation, reforestation and deforestation
[forestry activities] the set of IPCC definitions shall be applied.").
40. See id. ("Parties agree that for the implementation of Article 3.3 [of the Kyoto
Protocol], "forest" is defined in accordance with the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion ("FAO") definition.").
41. See Michael Grubb, The Outcome of the Berlin Conference, in THE EMERGING INTER-
2008]
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began shaping a more specific legal regime for addressing
LULUCF.42
The idea behind the more specific legal regime was to make
the UNFCCC's ultimate objective feasible by allowing developed
countries to offset part of their emissions commitments through
the joint implementation of project-based practices under flexi-
bility mechanisms43 and the promotion and enhancement of
sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases domestically.44
Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Kyoto Protocol mark the be-
ginning of a specific regulatory regime aimed at dealing with
LULUCF activities. The first decision to advance the mandate
established by the aforementioned provisions was Decision 9/
CP.4 of COP-4 in 1999. At first, the Parties opted for limiting
LULUCF activities to afforestation, reforestation, and deforesta-
tion practices 45 while providing enough flexibility to allow for
the inclusion of additional activities.46
NATIONAL REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCUuRES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN, supra
note 30, at 1, 2 (explaining that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice ("SBSTA") is "the main interlocutor between the scientific world and the
[UNFCCC] process" and noting that the SBSTA is different from the IPCC).
42. See OBERTHOR & OTT, supra note 9, at 132 (suggesting that the issue of sinks
was problematic in that there was little information available for the purposes of mak-
ing a decision).
43. See Anita M. Halvorssen, The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries-The Clean
Development Mechanism, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'V 353, 363 (2005) ("The Ky-
oto Protocol introduced three market-based, flexible mechanisms that enable Annex I
Parties to meet part of their emission reduction commitments in a more cost effective
manner. These mechanisms, also referred to as Kyoto Mechanisms, include emissions
trading, joint implementation, and .. .clean development mechanism ("CDM"). The
idea behind these mechanisms is that the cost of limiting emissions will differ from one
region to another, yet the benefit for the atmosphere is the same, regardless of where
the action is taken.").
44. See Mathew Vespa, Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, 29 EcoL-
ocw L.Q. 395, 409 (2002) (distinguishing domestic application of LULUCF from
LULUCF in the CDM).
45. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3(3) ("The net changes in greenhouse
gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced
land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and defor-
estation ... ."). Deforestation, when characterized as a LULUCF activity, refers to the
practice of preventing or reducing deforestation. It also means, for developed coun-
tries only, accountability for CO 2 emissions as a result of deforestation practices domes-
tically. See Pedro Moura-Costa & Marc D. Stuart, Forestry-Based Greenhouse Gas Mitigation:
A Short Story of Market Evolution, 77 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY REv. 191, 192 (1998).
46. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3(4) ("The Conference of the Parties
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon
as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and
which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emis-
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Afforestation and reforestation are both defined as the
human-induced conversion of non-forested areas into forested
land, 47 but they differ slightly: the definition of afforrestation
presupposes that the converted area has not been forested for at
least fifty years,4" while reforestation is limited to the conversion
of non-forested areas that were not forested on December 31,
1989.49
Amidst intense political debate over conflicting interests,5"
the Parties agreed upon additional activities at the seventh ses-
sion of the Conference of the Parties ("COP-7") in Marrakesh.5 '
Revegetation, forest management, cropland management, and
grazing land management were added as domestically con-
ducted activities but excluded asjointly implemented activities.52
The definitions of activities under the newly established
LULUCF legal regime, although broad in nature,53 were useful
operational guidance on handling this form of accountability
under the UNFCCC. Decision 16/CMP.1 of COP/MOP-1 pro-
vided definitions for the terms "forest," "afforestation," "refores-
tation," "deforestation," "revegetation," "forest management,"
"cropland management," and "grazing land management. '5 4
sions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change
and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for
Parties included in Annex I ....").
47. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct.
29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session-Part Two:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision 11/CP.7 Annex, 1 (b)-
(c), U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report-
Part Two (Volume I)].
48. See id. 1 (b).
49. See id. 1 (c).
50. See Rajamani, supra note 33, at 223 ("At COP-6, the Umbrella Group argued in
favor of including additional activities in the first commitment period. However, the
[Alliance of Small Island States ("AOSIS")] and the [European Union ("EU")] opposed
it.").
51. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision 11/CP.7.
52. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session-Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session,
Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex, 6, U.N. Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30,
2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two].
53. See Sagemfiller, supra note 13, at 203 (describing the definition of deforesta-
tion in the Marrakesh Accords as broad).
54. See COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two, supra note 52, Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex,
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C. The Two Different Approaches to Accounting for
Forests and Forestry Activities
Since developed countries were concerned that relying
solely on domestic measures to comply with greenhouse gas
emission reduction commitments could damage their national
economies, the Kyoto Protocol envisioned accountability
through market-based flexibility mechanisms: emissions trading,
joint implementation, and the CDM.5 As a result, countries
could pursue two possible approaches. Countries could account
for LULUCF domestically and/or participate in afforestation
and reforestation activities abroad.
1. Accounting for LULUCF Domestically
For some countries, accounting for LULUCF domestically
could offset up to ten percent of national gross emissions. For
others, due to demographics and land-use patterns, sequestra-
tion potentials from enhancement of sinks are limited.56 As a
consequence, at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, accounting for
LULUCF activities was a contentious issue that divided the Par-
ties considerably and impaired the Parties' progress towards a
common and satisfactory agreement.5
7
Through Decision 1l/CP.7 of COP-7, the Parties addressed
some of their previous concerns and requested that the SBSTA
and IPCC develop, and elaborate on, guidelines, monitoring,
and reporting methodologies. 58  Following the Parties' request,
the IPCC issued the following reports: Good Practice Guidance for
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry59 and Definitions and Meth-
55. See generally Tim Jackson et al., The Language of Flexibility: Operational forms of
Joint Implementation, in FLEXIBILITY IN CLIMATE POLICY. MAKING THE KYOTO MECHANISMS
WORK 16, 22-26 (Tim Jackson et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the flexibility mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol).
56. See G. CORNELIS VAN KOOTEN, CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS: WHY INTERNA-
TIONAL ACCORDS FAIL 74 (2004) ("Canada can claim 12 Mt C per year, the Russian
Federation 33 Mt C, Japan 13 Mt C, and other countries much lesser amounts-Ger-
many 1.24 Mt C, Ukraine 1.11 Mt C, and remaining countries less than 1.0 Mt C. Japan
expects to use forestry activities to meet a significant proportion of its [Kyoto Protocol]
obligation, while Canada can use forest management alone to achieve about one-fifth
of its emissions reduction targets.").
57. See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT" 79
(1999).
58. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision 11/CP.7, 2-3.
59. See INTERGOVERNMEN'AL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE
FOR LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (Jim Penman et al. eds., 2003), available
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odological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-Induced
Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types.6"
The IPCC's work and the SBSTA's advice were based on the gen-
eral principles governing accountability for LULUCF activities
undertaken domestically by Annex I countries. 6'
Under this framework regulatory regime, which governs
LULUCF accountability for the first commitment period, 62 a se-
lected domestic forestry activity can result in the augmentation
or the diminution of an Annex I Party's assigned amount.63 The
result depends on whether the practice constitutes a net sink or
a net source of greenhouse gases.6 4 Practices that are net sinks
of greenhouse gases will increase the assigned amount, while
practices that are net sources of greenhouse gases will decrease
the assigned amount.65 Accountable forestry activities include
afforestation, reforestation, deforestation, revegetation, forest,
cropland, and grazing land management.66
"Credits," which are awarded for any domestic improvement
using one or more of the above-mentioned forestry activities, in-
crease a Party's assigned amount for the first commitment pe-
riod.6 7 This is only true, though, if the party makes a timely for-
mal identification of the activities in its annual report6" and the
party demonstrates that the chosen activities have occurred since
1990 and are human-induced.6 9 On the other hand, whenever
verifiable human-induced changes in land use and forestry result
at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.orjp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf.htm [hereinafter
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LULUCF].
60. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DEFINITIONS AND METHOD-
OLOGICAL OPTIONS TO INVENTORY EMISSIONS FROM DIRECT HUMAN-INDUCED DEGRADA-
TION OF FORESTS AND DEVEGETATION OF OTHER VEGETATION TYPES (Jim Penman et al.
eds., 2003), available at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/degrada-
tion.htm.
61. See COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two, supra note 52, Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex,
17.
62. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3(7) (establishing the first commitment
period from 2008-2012, within which Annex I Parties will have to meet their quantified
limitation and reduction objectives set forth in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol).
63. See COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two, supra note 52, Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex,
17.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. 6.
67. See id. 1 17.
68. See id. 7.
69. See id. 1 8.
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in a net emission of greenhouse gas, an Annex I Party's assigned
amount is decreased. y
Greenhouse gas estimates of anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks are based on the annual national
inventories and communications mandated by the UNFCCC
71
and the national estimation systems the Kyoto Protocol requires
of Annex I Parties. 72 The information provided is used to estab-
lish assigned amounts. 7 Limitations, measured in metric tons of
CO 2 per year, are imposed on the augmentation and diminution
of each Annex I Party's assigned amount for domestic LULUCF
activities. 4
2. Accounting for Forestry Activities under Project-Based
Flexibility Mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol
Annex I Parties can claim credits against their assigned
amounts for forestry project activities implemented jointly with
another Annex I Party (joint implementation) 75 or with a non-
Annex I Party (CDM).76 The origin of joint projects can be
traced back to the text of the UNFCCC,77 which contemplates
the possibility of Annex I Parties implementing policies and
70. See id. 1 17; see also vAN KOOTEN, supra note 56, at 74 ("Afforestation and refor-
estation result in a credit, while deforestation (human-induced conversion of forestland
to non-forest use) results in a debit. Since most countries have not embarked on large-
scale afforestation and/or reforestation projects in the past decade, harvesting trees
during the five-year commitment period (2008-12) will cause them to have a debit on
the ARD account .... If there is no ARD debit, then a country cannot claim the
credit.").
71. See Halvorssen, supra note 43, at 360 ("[T]he UNFCCC required all Parties to
develop inventories of anthropogenic emissions and measures to mitigate climate
change. Furthermore, the UNFCCC also obligated all Parties to produce a report on
action they have taken to implement the UNFCCC, called 'national communications.'
To fulfill their reporting obligations, Annex I Parties were given six months from the
entry into force of the UNFCCC to submit their reports, while non-Annex I Parties
(developing countries) were given three years and the least developed States were not
given a deadline.").
72. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5(1).
73. See COP/MOP-i Report-Part Two, supra note 52, Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex,
20.
74. See id. Decision 16/CMP.1 Appendix.
75. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6.
76. See id. art. 12.
77. See Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol: What Does it
Mean For Project-Based Climate Change Mitigation ?, 3 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES
FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 1, 2-3 (1998).
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measures jointly."
On the road to Kyoto, and during the negotiations of the
Kyoto Protocol at COP-3, flexibility was a highly contentious is-
sue among the Parties. The JUSSCANNZ countries7" envisioned
the opportunity to invest in projects abroad as a cheap way to
mitigate their commitments (especially those related to forest
and forestry activities)" and as the only feasible way to achieve
them without hurting their economies. The G-77 s" (plus China)
and the European Union ("EU") saw it as a loophole. Develop-
ing countries referred to joint implementation as "eco-colonial-
ism."82 Opponents saw forest and forestry projects abroad as al-
lowing Annex I countries to invest in developing countries with-
out having to take stronger domestic mitigation measures.8 3
The controversy has become moot due to COP-7's express
embracement of forestry activities." 4 The conflicts were partially
resolved by the parties' agreement to limit forestry activities to
78. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4(2) (a) ("These [Annex I Parties] may imple-
ment such policies and measures [limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions]
jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achieve-
ment of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph.").
79. The JUSSCANNZ parties-Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Aus-
tralia, Norway, and New Zealand-are a group of countries that tended to counterbal-
ance the EU on the one hand and the G-77 on the other, although Norway, and Swit-
zerland in particular, frequently stood somewhat apart from JUSSCANNZ positions. See
GRLUBB ET AL., supra note 57, at xxxi.
80. See XVIII Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Wem-
bley, U.K, Sept. 24-29, 2001, Summary for Policymakers to Climate Change 2001: Synthesis
Report of the IPCC Third Assessment Report, at 15 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Synthesis Report
of the IPCC Third Assessment Report] ("Costs estimates reported to date for biological miti-
gation vary significantly from US$0.1 to about US$20 per t C in several tropical coun-
tries and from US$20 to US$100 per t C in non-tropical countries.").
81. The C-77 is a large coalition representing the interests of developing countries.
See Michael Richards, A Review of the Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation
in the Climate Change Convention Negotiations 15 (December 2001) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/iedg/participation-in-negotia-
tions/climatechange.pdf. Since it is composed of countries that are also, in some
cases, members of organizations such as Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries ("OPEC") and Alliance of Small Island States ("AOSIS"), the G-77 represents
countries that have very different interests. See id.
82. See Moura-Costa & Stuart, supra note 45, at 196-97.
83. See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 57, at 87 (describing some Annex I countries'
desire to obtain international flexibility and thus lessen domestic pressures against
emissions reductions).
84. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, 13 ("The eligibility of
land use, land-use change and forestry project activities under Article 12 is limited to
afforestation and reforestation.").
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afforestation and reforestation projects; 85 exclude nuclear activi-
ties; 86 and require that project-based activities be supplemental
to domestic measures and policies.8 7
II. FOREST AND FORESTRY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CDM:
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
This Section examines the legal and institutional
frameworks regarding forest and forestry activities under the
CDM and considers how they were influenced by the conflicting
interests surrounding them; the evolution of scientific and tech-
nological knowledge; and the experiences had during the AIJ
Pilot Phase.
A. The Evolution of the Legal Framework
The legal framework for forest and forestry activities under
the CDM is a product of a broader regulatory regime for joint
implementation flexibility mechanisms. Articles 4(2) (a),
4(2) (b), 4(2)(d), and 3(3) of the UNFCCC are the main pillars
of the joint implementation regulatory regime.88 The first ac-
tion in this regard was taken in 1995 at COP-i, when the parties
agreed upon the AIJ Pilot Phase.89 Shortly after, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol not only embraced the concept of joint implementation
among Annex I Parties,9 ° but extended it to non-Annex I coun-
tries through the CDM.9"
1. The AIJ Pilot Phase
The UNFCCC's broad provisions authorizing joint imple-
85. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12,
2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session-Part Two: Action Taken by
the Conference of the Parties at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/
2003/6/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report-Part Two].
86. See Jason Schwartz, Note, "Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know" How Kyoto
May Change Who Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 421, 457 (2006) (suggesting
that the EU accepted the inclusion of forestry in the CDM as a tradeoff for the exclu-
sion of nuclear power projects).
87. See COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9.
88. See Naoki Matsuo, CDM in the Kyoto Negotiations: How CDM Has Worked as a
Bridge Between Developed and Developing Worlds?, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES
FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 191, 192 (2003).
89. See COP-] Report-Part Two, supra note 28, 1 (a).
90. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6.
91. See id. art. 12.
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mentation of policies and measures92 were made operational
through the AIJ Pilot Phase. Decision 5/CP.1 of COP-1 in 1995
expressly recognized Article 4(2) (d)'s mandate, imposing upon
the Conference of the Parties the duty to regulate joint imple-
mentation of policies and measures aimed at curbing anthropo-
genic emission of greenhouse gases. To accommodate develop-
ing countries' concerns, activities undertaken pursuant to the
AIJ Pilot Phase did not provide credits against developed coun-
tries' assigned amounts, which at that time had not yet been
agreed upon. The AIJ Pilot Phase was voluntary in nature.
Moreover, the AIJ Pilot Phase embraced non-Annex I coun-
tries' participation through the hosting of project-based activi-
ties. This experimental period also covered, at least generically,
all relevant sources, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,
which allowed for the ample use of forest and forestry activities.
The fact is that "[t]he importance of information, training, ap-
propriate capacity and institutions for the development of CDM
projects is underlined by experience from the [AIJ Pilot
Phase] ."
The AIJ Pilot Phase yielded information regarding geo-
graphical trends and potential social and environmental benefits
related to forest and forestry activities, which provided substan-
tial background for future negotiations. 4 These elements were
all crucial during the discussions over flexibility mechanisms at
COP-3 and beyond, when negotiators faced conflicting pressures
on the issue of whether to include forest and forestry activities in
the CDM.95
92. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 3(3), 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 4(2)(d).
93. See Alex Michaelowa, CDM Host Country Institution Building, 8 MITIGATION ADAP-
TATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 201, 202 (2003).
94. See Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5,
1999, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review of
the Pilot Phase, Including the Third Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly-Note by
the Secretariat, 1 6-21, U.N. Doc FCCC/SB/1999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999
SBSTA & SBI Report] (presenting data on geographical distribution of projects, environ-
mental, and socio-economic impacts).
95. See id. 17-19 (providing an "[a]ssessment of environmental benefits related
to the mitigation of climate change that would not have occurred in the absence of
[Activities Implemented Jointly ("AIJ")], covering all relevant sources, sinks and reser-
voirs of greenhouse gases and the methods used to measure, monitor and indepen-
dently verify these emissions, including by type of project, and other environmental
benefits").
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a. A Brief Assessment of the Main Reports Regarding the AIJ
Pilot Phase and its Positive Outcomes
Through the reporting requirements of the AIJ Pilot Phase,
the SBSTA was able to produce annual synthesis reports before
recommending a comprehensive review of the AIJ Pilot Phase,
which was completed and sent to the fifth session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties ("COP-5") in 1999.96 Specifically, with regard
to forest and forestry activities, those annual synthesis reports97
and the final review of the AIJ Pilot Phase98 provided useful data
on important geographical trends; technical challenges (moni-
toring and reporting); social and environmental benefits and im-
pacts; possible global benefits (in comparison with other types of
activities); and effects on national economies (helping develop-
ing countries achieve sustainable development and developed
countries achieve their commitments under the climate change
regime).99 The figures below, excerpted from SBSTA synthesis
reports on the AIJ Pilot Phase, illustrate some of what was
learned about the above-mentioned issues during this experi-
mental period.
96. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct.
25-Nov. 5, 1999, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifth Session-Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifth Session, Decision 13/CP.5, pmbl., U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 (Feb. 2, 2000) (taking note of the SBSTA and SBI's compre-
hensive review of the AIJ pilot phase and third synthesis report on activities imple-
mented jointly).
97. See, e.g., 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report, supra note 94, 1 36-69.
98. See id. 5-35.
99. See id. 1 5-69.
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Figure 1
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Source: 1997 SBSTA Report.10 0
Figure 2
Source: 2001 SBSTA Report.10
100. Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Ad-
vice, Bonn, F.R.G., October 20-29, 1997, Activities Implemented jointly Under the Pilot
Phase: ;Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented jointly-Note by the Secretariat, 18 fig.1,
U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12 (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report].
i01. Fifteenth Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Ad-
vice, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 9, 2001, Activities Implemented jointly Under the
Pilot Phase: Fifth Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase-Note
by the Secretariat, Annex fig.4, U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2001/7 (Sept. 12, 2001) [herein-
aftw 2001 SBSTA Report].
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Figure 1 shows that while forest conservation and forestry
activities represented only six of the thirty-nine projects in 1997
(roughly fifteen percent of the total), they accounted for fifty-
seven percent of the final mitigation impact. Figure 2 shows that
although they represented fifteen of the 139 projects (roughly
ten percent of the total), forest conservation and forestry activi-
ties accounted for thirty-five percent of the abatement impact in
2001. The data demonstrates that although they represent a
smaller portion of the total number of projects, the CO2 storage
and sequestration potentials of forest and forestry activities is sig-
nificantly higher in comparison with other types of projects.
In its first synthesis report, the SBSTA highlighted that
"most data on the costs and the amount of [greenhouse gases]
abated are only estimates and are, therefore, not a suitable basis
for analysis. '"102 When the report was released, the Parties were
in the final preparations for the Kyoto negotiations. The IPCC
had not yet published its special report on LULUCF, which oc-
curred in 2000.03 The first specific decision on forestry activities
in the CDM was only agreed upon in 2003, at COP-9," °4 the same
year in which the IPCC's report on good practice guidance for
LULUCF was released.1 °5 This sequence of events explains the
correlation between the growing consensus on the challenges of
forest and forestry project activities and their decrease (with re-
spect to other types of projects considered much simpler) in
terms of quantity of projects and share of greenhouse gas abate-
ment impact.
As to the geographical distribution of forest conservation
and forestry projects and their environmental and socio-eco-
nomic impacts, the 1999 subsidiary bodies' report on the issues
to be addressed in the review of the AIJ Pilot Phase proved a
useful source of information for a more comprehensive assess-
ment of the AIJ Pilot Phase. With regard to the socio-economic
aspects of projects undertaken during the AIJ Pilot Phase, the
subsidiary bodies verified an increase in capacity-building
through enhancement of procedural and institutional experi-
ence, and the Parties reported "active involvement of local com-
102. See 1997 SBSTA Report, supra note 100, 6(c).
103. See IPCC SPECtAL ON REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18.
104. See COP-9 Report-Pail Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9.
105. See GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LULUCF, supra note 59.
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munities, increased public awareness, and the maintenance of
natural heritage and historical sites." °6
The report also highlighted how host Parties, mostly devel-
oping countries, were able to attract financial resources and di-
rect them towards national development goals. Despite the sub-
sidiary bodies' statement that socio-economic and environmen-
tal factors were not sufficiently addressed, particularly with
respect to forest and forestry activities, the Parties reported "fos-
tering biodiversity, improving water and air quality and reducing
erosion of hydrological resources" as environmental benefits.1 °7
In the AIJ Pilot Phase review report, some Parties linked
their development goals to forestry and land-use. 0 8 Indeed, Fig-
ure 3 demonstrates that those Parties, although not identified in
the report, are most likely developing countries in Latin
America. Figure 3 shows that most of the forest preservation and
reforestation projects, and roughly half of the afforestation activ-
ities, were taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean re-
gion. This is not surprising given that a large percentage of the
remaining tropical forests in the world are concentrated in Latin
America."°"
One can get a better sense of the region's potential for
these types of projects by noting that the data presented does
not include information regarding Brazil," 0 which contains a
considerable portion of the world's remaining tropical forests."'
In addition to the resources availability element, the costs of for-
est and forestry greenhouse gas abatement practices are consid-
erably lower in developing countries, 1 2 which contributed to
Latin America's share of the market in hosting preservation, re-
forestation, and afforestation project activities.
106. See 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report, supra note 94, 1 57.
107. See id.
108. See id. 15.
109. See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assess-
ment 2005: Progress Towards Sustainable Forest Management, 15 (FAO Forestry Paper 147,
2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/AO400E/AO400EOO.pdf [herein-
after Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005].
110. See 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report, supra note 94, 44 n.21 (listing Belize, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama as hosting
projects in Latin America).
111. See Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005, supra note 109, at 15.
112. See Synthesis Report of the IPCC Third Assessment Report, supra note 80, at 15.
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Figure 3
Source: 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report (AFR: Africa; ASP: Asia and Pacific Region; EIT:
Economies in Transition; LAC: Latin America and Caribbean).' 1 3
b. The Main Challenges Encountered During
the AIJ Pilot Phase
The AIJ Pilot Phase review report summarized the major
problems encountered by the Parties during the implementation
of activities. Highlighting common problems during the AIJ Pi-
lot Phase was a useful tool for improving the flexibility mecha-
nisms of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly with respect to the
CDM." 4 The following are some of the general obstacles en-
countered during all types of projects under the AIJ Pilot Phase:
(a) differences in the investment climate; (b) cultural differ-
ences; (c) insufficient infrastructure; (d) institutional capac-
ity; (e) relative absence of investment companies; (f) lack of
policy on AIJ and of a clear and transparent set of operational
rules on the part of the host country; (g) lack of awareness in
the private sector in host countries on opportunities repre-
sented by AIJ; (h) variations in the degree of knowledge and
acceptance of AIJ by local stakeholders; (i) lack of capacity to
produce comprehensive AIJ project proposals; (j) existing
preferences, driven by established business partnerships, stra-
113. 1999 SBSTA & SBI Repot, supra note 94, 45 fig.3.
114. See Michaelowa, supra note 93, at 202.
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tegic considerations and political priorities for investors for
particular areas; (k) differences in [greenhouse gas] reduc-
tion costs and in transaction costs due to, inter alia, some of
the above points; and (1) current exclusion of crediting for
[greenhouse gas] reductions or removals by sinks." 15
Other general obstacles included "high transaction costs"" 6 and
"the uncertainty regarding two major interlinked methodologi-
cal issues, the identification of the project baseline and addition-
ality."' 17
It is worth noting that the AIJ Pilot Phase was characterized
by a lack of strong oversight, which can be traced to a weak regu-
latory regime. Therefore, even though the data presented were
useful to negotiators in developing the regulatory framework for
afforestation and reforestation practices in the CDM, and help-
ful in indicating trends and potentials, the results lacked accu-
racy. Nonetheless, the AIJ Pilot Phase was crucial in that it called
attention to the technical, scientific, and socio-economic chal-
lenges related to forest and forestry activities, which inevitably
represented one of the most important factors in the develop-
ment of a stronger and tighter regulatory regime aimed at deal-
ing with forest and forestry activities in the CDM.
t1 8
2. The CDM of the Kyoto Protocol
After the COP-3 negotiations, project-based joint implemen-
tation under the UNFCCC ended up, via the Kyoto Protocol, di-
vided into joint implementation and the CDM. It is worth not-
ing that the final language of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol
(which addresses the CDM) provided the CDM with a threefold
objective." 9 The CDM's purpose is to: (1) assist non-Annex I
Parties in achieving sustainable development; (2) contribute to
the UNFCCC's overall objective; and (3) help developed coun-
tries achieve their quantified emissions limitation and reduction
commitments. 1
20
115. 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report, supra note 94, 8.
116. See id. 1 22.
117. See id.
118. See generally Moura-Costa & Stuart, supra note 45, at 5-7 (following the devel-
opment of AIJ programs through the difficult early phases to the eventual creation of
the CDM).
119. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12(2).
120. See id.
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3. The Controversy Regarding Whether Forests and Forestry
Activities Were Meant to be Included in the CDM
Prior to the negotiations at COP-3, the Parties had before
them the 1997 SBSTA synthesis report on the AIJ Pilot Phase. 121
This report, which was noted in Decision 1O/CP.3 of COP-3,12 2
indicated the existence of six ongoing forestry preservation and
afforestation activities and the ample participation of developing
countries as project hosts. 1 2 3
Opponents of the inclusion of sinks in the CDM 124 argued
that Article 12 did not provide legal support for such inclusion.
They argued that while Article 6 (regarding joint implementa-
tion) clearly mentions sinks, Article 12 does not. In addition,
the opposition argued that because sink projects could not be
accurately measured, they did not meet Article 12(5) (b)'s re-
quirement that certification under the CDM be on the basis of
"[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the miti-
gation of climate change .... 125
Indeed, whereas Article 6 refers expressly to projects provid-
ing enhancement of removals by sinks, Article 12 addresses pro-
ject activities generally and without further specification. 26
However, a closer analysis shows that the climate change regime
did not provide for the exclusion of sink projects in the CDM. 127
First, the CDM originated in the UNFCCC's joint implementa-
tion provisions, and under the AIJ Pilot Phase, Annex I and non-
Annex I Parties utilized forest and forestry activities amply. Sec-
121. See 1997 SBSTA Report, supra note 100.
122. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1-11,
1997, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session-Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at its Third Session, Decision 10/CP.3, pmbl., U.N. Doc FCCC/
CP/1997/7/Add.1 (Mar. 25, 1998).
123. See 1997 SBSTA Report, supra note 100, 6.
124. The EU was the main opponent of the inclusion of forestry in the CDM, while
the Umbrella Group (United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ice-
land) was the main proponent. See Pedro Moura-Costa, Carbon Trading and Invest-
ment in Clean Energy Products 4 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.ecosecurities.com/Assets/3157/Pubs Carbon% 20trading%20and%20investiment
%20in%20clean%20energy%20projects.pdf.
125. GRUBB ET AL., supra note 57, at 241.
126. Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6(1) (referring specifically to en-
hancement of removals by sinks of greenhouse gases), with Kyoto Protocol, supra note
14, art. 12(5) (referring to "emission reductions" generally).
127. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 645 ("Both the Framework Convention
and the Kyoto Protocol clearly contemplate that sinks such as forests would be within
the ambit of the climate regime.").
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ond, Article 12 does not identify any specific type of project,
such as renewable energy or energy efficiency. 128 It is limited to
setting forth the CDM's objectives12' and general information re-
garding the CDM's operation. l 0 The omission, then, represents
a mere inaccuracy in the Kyoto Protocol's written language.
Moreover, contrary to the position of those subscribing to the
impossibility of measuring and monitoring forestry projects, cur-
rently approved monitoring methodologies by the CDM's Execu-
tive Board demonstrate that forestry activities can be monitored
and measured, albeit with more difficulty.
Common ground was possible, at least in part, because of
the leverage exerted by countries pushing for the inclusion of
forestry activities (the Umbrella Group),"'1 particularly the
United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia.1 1 2 Considering that
the United States and other Umbrella Group countries account
for over half of the world's emissions, their engagement was cru-
cial to the Kyoto Protocol's success. Another important aspect
was the EU's refusal to accept the inclusion of nuclear projects
in the CDM. In order to avoid any attempt by the United States,
or China and India, to push the debate on the inclusion of nu-
clear energy projects forward, the EU showed some flexibility
and ended up accepting forestry activities in the CDM.133 The
controversy was finally settled at COP-7, where negotiators
agreed to include forestry in the CDM but limited it to afforesta-
tion and reforestation activities. 3
4. The Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Sessions of the
Conference of the Parties
Although no consensus was reached at the sixth session of
128. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12(5) (referring to "emission reduc-
tions" generally).
129. See, e.g., id. art. 12(2) (stating that one of the CDM's purposes is to assist
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development).
130. See, e.g., id. art. 12(4) (subjecting the CDM to the control of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Partes and the supervision of an executive
board).
131. See A Brief Analysis of COP-6 Part II, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL.,Jul. 30, 2001,
at 13, availables at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12176e.pdf.
132. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 456.
133. See id. at 457.
134. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision 11/CP.7,
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the Conference of the Parties ("COP-6") and COP-6 "bis" on the
issue of LULUCF generally,' 35 progress made during those two
meetings allowed for the inclusion of forestry activities in the
CDM at COP-7 in Marrakesh in 2001. The outcome of this meet-
ing was called the "Marrakesh Accords. 1 36 Through the annex
to the decision on LULUCF, the Parties finally agreed on the
inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM. Their inclusion, how-
ever, was limited in the following ways: (1) forestry in the CDM
was limited to afforestation and reforestation activities; 37 (2) to-
tal additions to a Party's assigned amount were limited to one
percent of base year emissions times five; l"' and (3) a regulatory
regime for future commitment periods would be decided upon
during the negotiations on the second commitment period. 39
Broadly speaking, the EU's main interests prevailed over the
Umbrella Group's main interests, at least for the first commit-
ment period. The EU succeeded in banning nuclear projects in
the CDM; 4 ° limiting forestry activities to afforestation and refor-
estation;14 ' and limiting the amount accountable against an An-
nex I Party's assigned amount. 4 2 In practice, since the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme ("ETS") excluded carbon credits originat-
ing from LULUCF activities,143 and European countries (and
their private entities) represent the vast majority of Annex I buy-
ers (taking into account that the United States has not yet rati-
fied the Kyoto Protocol),' the inclusion of forestry in the CDM
did not significantly affect the EU's interests for the first commit-
ment period. Still, the Umbrella Group did manage to insert
135. SeeA BriefAnalysis of COP-6 Part II, supra note 131, at 13 ("The collapse of The
Hague negotiations was attributed by many observers to disagreement over LULUCF
issues: 'It was sinks that sunk The Hague."').
136. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision II/CP.7, 1 1.
137. See id. 13(e).
138. See id. Decision 11/CP.7 Annex, 14.
139. See id. 1 15.
140. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco,
Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session-Part Two:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II), Decision 17/CP.7, pmbl., U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume
II)].
141. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision Il/CP.7 An-
nex, 1 13.
142. See id. 11.
143. See Council Directive No. 2004/101/EC, art. 1, 2004 O.J. L 338, at 18, 21.
144. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, Annex I.
SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREATIES
sinks in the CDM and left open the debate for future commit-
ment periods.
Once forestry made it into the CDM and the Parties had
established flexibility for the future and general eligibility and
offsetting limitations, an operational regulatory regime was
needed. Despite no progress at the eighth session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties ("COP-8") in 2002, the Parties would agree
upon a thorough regulatory regime for forestry in the CDM at
the ninth session of the Conference of the Parties ("COP-9") in
2003.' Decision 19/CP.9 set up modalities and procedures for
afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM.'46 Deci-
sion 19/CP.9 was also important because it affirmed the princi-
ples of Decision 11/CP.7 of COP-7 on LULUCF 14 7 and envi-
sioned a more flexible regulatory regime for small-scale forestry
projects in the CDM, 148 which would follow a model that the Par-
ties had already implemented at COP-8 for CDM activities such
as renewable energy and energy efficiency. 4 9
The legal framework for forestry under the CDM in the first
commitment period was completed when the Parties, at the
tenth session of the Conference of the Parties ("COP-10") in
2004, agreed upon Decision 14/CP.10, which set forth simplified
modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and re-
forestation activities under the CDM."5 ° This regulatory regime
was implemented at the first Meeting of the Parties in 2005, right
after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force. 51 Table 1 pro-
145. See COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9.
146. See id.
147. See id. pmbl.
148. See id. 1 3-6.
149. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, New Delhi, India, Oct.
23-Nov. 1, 2002, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighth Session-Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session, Decision 21/CP.8 Annex II, U.N.
Doc FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.3 (Mar. 28, 2003).
150. See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Buenos Aires, Arg., Dec.
6-18, 2004, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth Session-Part Two: Action Taken
by the Conference of the Parties at its Tenth Session, Decision 14/CP.10, U.N. Doc FCCC/
CP/2004/10/Add.2 (Apr. 19, 2005).
151. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Par-
ties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session-Part One:
Proceedings, 1 8, U.N. Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8 (Mar. 30, 2006) ("The President
said that there had been many remarkable achievements on the path from Kyoto to
Montreal, including the steadfast efforts by many countries to promote the ratification
of the Protocol, the completion of the Marrakesh Accords, and the prompt start of the
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vides a chronological overview of the general and specific legal
provisions applicable to forestry project activities under the
CDM.
Table 1
Provision Subject Status Adoption
Arts. JI under the General 1992 UNFCCC
4.2(a) (b) (d) & Convention
3.3 / UNFCCC
Dec. 5/CP.1 AIJ Pilot Phase General 1995 COP-1
Arts. 3.3, 3.4 & LULUCF General / 1997 Kyoto
12 / Kyoto Activities & the Specific Protocol
Protocol CDM
Decs. 7 & 9/ CDM & General 1998 COP-4
CP.4 LULUCF Work
Programme
Decs. 11, 15 & LULUCF Specific 2001 COP-7
17/CP.7 Activities & the
CDM
Dec. 21/CP.8 CDM Specific 2002 COP-8
Dec. 19/CP.9 A/R in the Specific 2003 COP-9
CDM
Decs. 13 & 14/ Reporting A/R Specific 2004 COP-10
CP.10 in the CDM &
Simplified A/R
Activities in the
CDM
Decs. 2, 3, 4, 5, Adopting draft Specific / 2005 MOP-1
6, 16 & 17/ decisions General
CMP.1 recommended
by previous
COPs
B. The Institutional Framework
The UNFCCC launched a comprehensive institutional
framework for implementing measures and polices; developing
guidelines and methodologies; and coordinating and translating
clean development mechanism. National efforts to implement the provisions of the
Protocol were now well under way.").
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scientific work into norms and decisions 5 2 aimed at achieving
the UNFCCC's ultimate objective: stabilize "greenhouse gas con-
centrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system
.... "153 Accordingly, the institutions dealing with forestry in the
CDM are the product of a broader framework, one that relies
not only upon the supreme bodies of the UNFCCC and the Ky-
oto Protocol, but also upon more specific institutions unique to
the control and management of afforestation and reforestation
projects in the CDM. The following two sections break down the
CDM's institutional framework with respect to forestry.
1. The Conference of the Parties and Meeting of the Parties
With primary decision-making power, the Conference of the
Parties is the highest body in the institutional hierarchy and the
organ from which the regulatory scheme emerges.' 54 Therefore,
the decisions on forestry in the CDM 155 derive their legal force
from the powers conferred to the Conference of the Parties by
the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol set forth the CDM's specific
institutional framework 56 and granted the Conference of the
Parties the function of serving as the Meeting of the Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol.'57
2. The SBSTA and the CDM Executive Board
The SBSTA is the advisory body that links available scientific
information to the climate change regime's decision-making
process.'5 8 It is different from the IPCC and was not designed to
replace it.'59 Article 15 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the sub-
152. See UNFCCC HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 27-43.
153. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 2.
154. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 233 ("Much like a corporate body of
directors, the conferences of the parties ("CoPs") are the primary policy-making organs
of most global environmental treaty regimes. The CoPs usually occur once every one or
two years and conduct the major business of monitoring, updating, revising, and en-
forcing the conventions.").
155. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 7.
156. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12.
157. See id. art. 13(1).
158. See COP-i Report-Part Two, supra note 28, Decision 6/CP.1 (characterizing
the SBSTA as "the link between the scientific, technical and technological assessments
and the information provided by competent international bodies, and the policy-ori-
ented needs of the Conference of the Parties").
159. See Grubb, supra note 41, at 2.
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sidiary bodies created under the UNFCCC remain in charge of
providing scientific and technological advice and assistance to
the Conference of the Parties and the Meeting of the Parties. 160
The SBSTA takes into account the work of other international
institutions, such as the IPCC; provides guidance on scientific,
technical, and technological matters; and recommends decisions
to the Conference of the Parties and the Meeting of the Par-
ties.
1 6 1
Another important organ in the CDM forestry institutional
framework is the CDM Executive Board. Featured in Article
12(4) of the Kyoto Protocol, the Executive Board was promul-
gated to oversee CDM activities under the guidance and author-
ity of the Conference of the Parties and the Meeting of the Par-
ties. 112 Through Decision 17/CP.7, the Conference of the Par-
ties expanded the Executive Board's supervisory role by granting
it decision-making power over the approval of designated opera-
tional entities ("DOEs");163 the final work on new methodolo-
gies;... baseline and monitoring methodologies;165 and issuance
160. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 15(1).
161. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision I1/CP.7, 2.
The SBSTA's eighth session report is a good example of its work. In this report, the
SBSTA offered an interpretation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol; requested that the
IPCC prepare a report regarding LULUCF; invited the Parties to submit data relating to
the implementation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol and modalities, rules, and
guidelines regarding additional human-induced activities under Article 3.4 of the Kyoto
Protocol; called for a workshop of experts; and requested that the secretariat liaise with
the secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the secretariat of the Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification, the International Forum on Forests, the FAO, and any
other international organizations that might have relevant information. See Eighth Ses-
sion of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., June
2-12, 1998, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its Eighth
Session, 45, U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTA/1998/6 (Aug. 12, 1998), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/1998/sbsta/06.pdf.
162. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II), supra note 140, Decision 17/CP.7 An-
nex, 5.
163. See id. 5(f); Wolfram Kdgi & Dieter Sch6ne, Forestry Projects Under the CDM:
Procedures, Experiences and Lessons Learned 9 (U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization,
Forests and Climate Change Working Paper No. 3, 2005) ("DOEs are accredited by the
Executive Board and perform two functions: validating CDM projects, and verifying
and certifying emissions reductions from projects. A designated operational entity shall
not perform validation or verification and certification on the same CDM [afforesta-
tion/reforestation] project activity.").
164. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II), supra note 140, Decision 17/CP.7 An-
nex, 5(d).
165. See id.
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of certified emission reductions ("CERs").' 6 6 In sum, the Execu-
tive Board is the administrative body in charge of handling
projects undertaken pursuant to the CDM and all related mat-
ters.
16 7
3. DOEs and the Afforestation and
Reforestation Working Group
The CDM Executive Board can accredit DOEs and recom-
mend them to the Conference of the Parties and Meeting of the
Parties for final designation. 6 The idea behind DOEs is to pre-
serve the Executive Board's oversight and decision-making role
over proposed new methodologies while delegating validation,
verification, and certification processes to a specialized outside
corporation that is presumably more efficient at accomplishing
the tasks. 69 If the Executive Board had to operate the technical
field work associated with validation, verification, and certifica-
tion for each proposed project, the financial and human re-
sources necessary would make the process unfeasible t7 °
In addition, by working with different and independent
DOEs in the validation, verification, and certification stages, the
Executive Board's institutional framework is constantly being
crosschecked, diminishing the likelihood of imprecise CERs.
This third-party audit scheme is particularly important in light of
how non-Annex I countries do not have emissions limitation
commitments. 7 a The downside is that such a comprehensive
process adds bureaucracy and complexity, requiring a high level
of multidisciplinary expertise. This, in turn, reduces participa-
tion by developing countries' stakeholders, despite the thorough
166. See id. 1 64-66.
167. See Michaelowa, supra note 93, at 203.
168. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II), supra note 140, Decision 17/CP.7 An-
nex, 5(f).
169. See C IMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: THE FIRST
TEN YEARS 87 (2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first
ten-years-en.pdf.
170. See Moura-Costa & Stuart, supra note 45, at 199 ("It became obvious that
third-party certification was instrumental in the validation and credibility of these new
transactions.").
171. See id. at 196 (noting the danger that developing countries would transfer
their inexpensive greenhouse gas reduction opportunities to industrialized countries
because, in light of the fact that developing countries did not have emission commit-
ments, the commodity was valueless).
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capacity-building scheme envisioned by the climate change re-
gime. 172
Finally, since there is a wide range of scientific, technical,
and technological expertise needed for different projects under
the CDM, the Conference of the Parties conferred upon the Ex-
ecutive Board the authority to "establish committees, panels or
working groups to assist it in the performance of its func-
tions. 171
At its fourteenth meeting, the Executive Board agreed to
establish an Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group
("A&R WG") for forestry-related projects. 174 The A&R WG is re-
sponsible for commenting on proposed baseline and monitoring
methodologies for forestry projects, preparing draft reformatted
versions of those approved by the Executive Board, and recom-
mending available options for expanding the applicability of ap-
proved afforestation and reforestation methodologies. 175 In this
sense, the A&G WG works closely and in consonance with the
Methodologies Panel, which, as agreed upon at the Executive
Board's third meeting, 176 is designed to provide the Executive
Board with recommendations on proposed new methodologies
and baseline and monitoring plans, including those designed for
afforestation and reforestation projects. 1 77
4. Multilateral Investment Institutions
Multilateral investors are an important element of the CDM
forestry institutional framework and the growth of carbon mar-
kets worldwide. The greenhouse gas tradable permit trading
mechanism, coordinated by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, and the greenhouse gas emissions trad-
172. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision 2/CP.7 (ad-
dressing capacity-building in developing countries).
173. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II), supra note 140, Decision 17/CP.7 An-
nex, 18.
174. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., June 12-14, 2004, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Four-
teenth Meeting Report, 13, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-14 (June 14, 2004).
175. See Kgi & Sch6ne, supra note 163, at 9-10.
176. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., Apr. 9-10, 2002, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Third
Meeting Report, 48, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-03 (Apr. 17, 2002).
177. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., June 9-10, 2002, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Fourth
Meeting Report, 11, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-04 (June 10, 2002).
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ing program, proposed by the International Petroleum Ex-
change, are examples of noteworthy carbon market initiatives
that could be attractive to investors and project developers in the
post-Kyoto period.'78 These early, innovative attempts were fol-
lowed by the creation of the International Emissions Trading As-
sociation, the Emissions Market Association, the Chicago Cli-
mate Exchange, and country-level emission trading systems in
countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark.'79
In 2003, the World Bank launched the BioCarbon Fund,
which is described as a public/private initiative aiming at deliver-
ing "cost-effective emission reductions, while promoting bi-
odiversity conservation and poverty alleviation."' ° The Bio-
Carbon fund was inspired by the World Bank's Prototype Car-
bon Fund, which was established in 1999 to promote renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects under the CDM.' l While
there are general carbon investment funds currently available
worldwide, 8 2 the BioCarbon Fund is the main multilateral in-
vestment institution for the purposes of the CDM forestry institu-
tional framework because it involves public and private investors
and is particularly sensitive to social and environmental bene-
fits. 183
C. Provisions for Domestic Legal and Institutional Frameworks
One of the core principles of the CDM is that participation
is voluntary and dependent upon prior approval.184 Further-
more, in accomplishing one of the CDM's objectives-assisting
178. See Moura-Costa & Stuart, supra note 45, at 178.
179. See Moura-Costa, supra note 124, at 7.
180. Carbon Finance at the World Bank: BioCarbon Fund, http://carbonfinance.
org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708 (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
181. See Lauren Kelly & Jeffery Jordan, World Bank, The Prototype Carbon Fund-
Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Ap-
proach to Global Problems, 2004, available at http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oed
doclib/nsf/24cc3bbl f94ae I c85256808006a0046/0e908333fedb369485256f690069ccd
5/$FILE/gppp-carbonwp.pdf.
182. The European Carbon Fund is one example. See European Carbon Fund,
About ECF, http://www.europeancarbonfund.com/about-ecf.php (last visited Nov. 15,
2007).
183. See Carbon Finance at the World Bank: BioCarbon Fund, supra note 180
(describing the BioCarbon Fund as a public/private initiative aimed at delivering cost-
effective emission reductions while promoting biodiversity conservation and poverty al-
leviation).
184. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12(5)(a).
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developing countries in achieving sustainable development-the
Conference of the Parties requires project developers to obtain
confirmation from the host country that a proposed project ac-
tivity meets its sustainable development goals. 185 The procedural
participation requirement imposed on non-Annex I Parties wish-
ing to participate in the CDM and, therefore, externalize to pro-
ject developers voluntariness and compliance with sustainable
development goals, is the establishment of a designated national
authority ("DNA").186 This provision allows for the development
of national legal and institutional frameworks by non-Annex I
countries desiring to participate in the CDM.
III. CURRENT OBSTACLES TO, AND IMPACTS OF,
FORESTRY A CTIVITIES UNDER THE CDM
In light of its controversial nature, forestry activities under
the CDM have been conducive to many assessments (both posi-
tive and negative) regarding the impacts resulting from their im-
plementation. Moreover, the expansion of permitted forestry
activities beyond afforestation and reforestation projects is facing
political, legal, and technical obstacles.
A. Political and Legal Obstacles
G.J.H. van Hoof has pointed out that "[i]f delay in, or fail-
ure of ratification are the result of unwillingness on the part of
the States concerned, the problem, of course, is first of all of a
political nature." '"8 The United States' refusal to ratify the Ky-
oto Protocol, the EU's decision to reject CDM forestry projects,
and the limitation of forestry to afforestation and reforestation
activities, form the core obstacles examined in this section.
1. The United States' Refusal to Ratify the Kyoto Protocol
In 1998, the U.S. Senate passed Senate Resolution 98, which
"urged the President not to agree to a treaty that did not include
binding commitments for developing countries, or that would
185. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II), supra note 140, Decision 17/CP.7 An-
nex, 1 40(a).
186. See id. 29.
187. See G.J.H. VAN HooF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122
(1983).
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cause harm to the U.S. economy." "' In March of 2001, the Bush
Administration announced the rejection of the Kyoto Proto-
col, 18 9 shortly after the United States experienced the tragedies
of September 11, 2001. Although it is not clear whether the ter-
rorist attacks influenced U.S. policies with regard to the climate
change legal regime, some have suggested that the lack of
stronger involvement in the Kyoto Protocol over the past years
indicates that the tragedy may have shifted the United States'
focus.190
For what it represents economically and politically, the
United States is a major player in any international negotiation.
Therefore, U.S. resistance to accepting the Kyoto Protocol con-
stitutes a significant political obstacle to the development of for-
estry activities within the climate change legal regime, because
the country was among those pushing forward the inclusion of
such activities in the CDM legal framework.' 91 By ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol, the United States could play a much greater role
in pushing negotiations towards expanding eligible activities for
future commitment periods and stimulating the market for for-
estry CERs.
2. The EU's Refusal to Accept Forestry Activities
under the CDM
On January 1, 2005, the EU's ETS became the world's larg-
est domestic greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. 9 2 The
market for CERs created by the ETS significantly increased the
demand for activities undertaken pursuant to the CDM. This
was not the case for afforestation and reforestation, as the EU's
provision authorizing the use of CERs expressly excluded their
188. See JOHN R. JUSTUS & SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS ISSUE
BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2004).
189. See id. at 11.
190. See Todd M. Lopez, Note, A Look at Climate Change and the Evolution of the Kyoto
Protocol, 43 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 285, 306 (2003).
191. See OBERTHOR & OTr, supra note 9, at 132-33; Michaelowa, supra note 92, at
201 ("fG]iven the absence of the US and the weakening of industrialised country emis-
sion targets through higher allowances for sinks, the demand for emission reductions
abroad will be much lower than originally anticipated.").
192. See Marjan Peeters, The Enforcement of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading
in Europe-Reliability Ensured? 3 (Oct. 16, 2006) (paper presented at the Fourth
World Conservation Union ("IUCN") Colloquium on Environment Enforcement and
Compliance, on file with the author).
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use with regard to LULUCF activities. 93 Since most of the coun-
tries with established commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
are members of the EU,' 94 the policy of excluding CERs from
forestry project activities is a major obstacle for the enhance-
ment of a stronger market in this area, which inevitably hampers
the development of new forestry-based greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion projects within the CDM.' 95
3. The CDM's Limitation to Afforestation
and Reforestation Activities
One of the major obstacles to the expansion of LULUCF
projects in the CDM for the first commitment period is the limi-
tation of activities to anthropogenic afforestation and reforesta-
tion practices. A preoccupation with ensuring the effectiveness
of such a limitation compelled climate change negotiators to in-
clude it in at least three different decisions prior to the first
Meeting of the Parties.196 Moreover, "[t] he literature regarding
forestry as a climate change mitigation strategy suggests that ef-
forts to constrain project-based forestry interventions to refores-
tation and afforestation projects is technically inappropriate."197
B. Technical Challenges
According to the FAO, the forestry sector is "technically es-
pecially challenging in terms of CDM project formulation
.... "198 The first substantial decision addressing accountability
for domestic action on LULUCF came during COP-7. The Par-
ties requested that the SBSTA develop definitions and modalities
for including afforestation and reforestation while taking into
193. See Council Directive No. 2004/101/EC, art. 1, 2004 O.J. L 338, at 18, 21 ("All
[Certified Emission Reductions ("CERs")] and [Emission Reduction Units ("ERUs")]
that are issued and may be used in accordance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Proto-
col and subsequent decisions adopted thereunder may be used in the Community
scheme . . .except for CERs and EURs from land use, land use change and forestry
activities.").
194. See UNFCCC, supra note 7, Annex I.
195. See Moura-Costa & Stuart, supra note 45, at 197 (observing that uncertainty
regarding the potential value of forestry projects greatly reduces the level of investment
in these projects).
196. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision ll/CP.7 An-
nex, 13; COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II), supra note 140, Decision 17/CP.7, 7(a);
COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9, pmbl.
197. Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 77, at 29.
198. KAgi & Sch6ne, supra note 163, at 1.
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account the issues of non-permanence, additionality, and leak-
age.199 These technical concerns stemmed from problems the
IPCC reported in its 2000 special report on LULUCF. 20  Fur-
thermore, Decision 19/CP.9's requirement that non-Annex I
countries opt for a definition of forest based on pre-established
parameters201 represented an additional technical challenge. 20 2
1. Additionality
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that emissions
reductions from CDM projects must be "additional to any that
would occur in the absence of the certified project activity. '20 3
The rationale behind additionality lies in the fact that "if the
developing nation would have undertaken the same emissions
reduction projects even in the absence of Annex I investment,
the world could have enjoyed the same emissions reductions
without the CDM and without giving Annex I countries credits
that let them emit more."
20 4
Aiming to assist forestry project developers, the A&R WG
revised a tool for demonstration and assessment of additional-
ity.2° Although not mandatory, the Executive Board adopted it
at its twenty-first meeting as a highly recommended guideline,20 6
which shows that considerable progress was made over the past
decade and a half. More recently, the CDM Executive Board, at
its thirty-fifth meeting, updated and revised the first version of
the aforementioned guidelines and adopted its second ver-
199. See COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision I1/CP.7,
2(e).
200. See IPCC SPECtAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 5 (bringing technical
challenges related to LULUCF to the attention of policymakers).
201. See COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9 Annex, 1 7-9.
202. See Till Neeff et al., Choosing a Forest Definition for the Clean Development Mecha-
nism 1 (FAO, Forests and Climate Change, Working Paper No. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.fao.org/forestry/webview/media?mediald= 11280&langld=1 (suggesting
that choosing a definition for forest can be a difficult process).
203. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12(5) (c).
204. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 426.
205. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., Sept. 28-30, 2005, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty
First Meeting Report Annex 16: Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in
AIR CDM Project Activities, at 8, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-21 (Sept. 30, 2005).
206. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., Sept. 28-30, 2005, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty
First Meeting Report, 17, 44, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-21 (Sept. 30, 2005); KAgi & Sch6ne,
supra note 163, at 5.
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207sion.
Verifying whether a project activity meets the additionality
requirement is crucial in a baseline-credit emissions trading
scheme such as the CDM.2 °8 It often presents a technical chal-
lenge, especially in the forestry field,2 0 9 because of the strict cri-
teria applicable in identifying whether a projected scenario
would occur in the absence of a CDM project-activity. There-
fore, additionality is a necessary technical burden that needs to
be properly addressed on a project-by-project basis.21 °
2. Domestic Definitions of Forest
In its 2000 special report on LULUCF, the IPCC high-
lighted that a successful forestry carbon offset program would
necessarily depend on clear definitions of forest and forestry ac-
tivities. Countries have defined the term forest in varying ways
using different criteria, such as legal, administrative, or cultural
considerations. 21' Nonetheless, for the successful implementa-
tion of LULUCF activities it is crucial to harmonize the defini-
tions for the purposes of the climate change legal regime.212 In
an attempt to harmonize domestic definitions, the annex to De-
cision 19/CP.9 imposed the requirement that countries define
forests prior to participating in the CDM. This provision allowed
the Parties some flexibility in defining forests. The Parties could
opt for minimum tree crown cover, land area, and tree height in
values varying from 10 percent to 30 percent, 0.05 to 1 hectare,
and 2 to 5 meters, respectively.21' The idea behind this was to
provide the Parties with the ability to adjust their domestic defi-
nition according to their individual natural and geographic real-
ities. An international uniform definition would not be able to
207. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty
Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in
AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 02), U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19, 2007).
208. See Dennis Hirsch et al., Emissions Trading-Practical Aspects, in GLOBAL CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAw 628 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (differentiating a base-
line-credit from a cap-and-trade emissions trading program).
209. See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 57, at 192 ("[T]he question of 'additionality'
under the CDM-and possibly sinks-is so complex that it cannot be assumed that all
emission reductions under these mechanisms will be real and additional.").
210. See Kgi & Sch6ne, supra note 163, at 5.
211. See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, 1 16.
212. See Watson & Verardo, supra note 24.
213. See COP-9 Report - Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9 Annex, 8.
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encompass the enormous variety of ecosystems around the
world, and would inevitably end up favoring some countries to
the detriment of others.2 1 4
Soon after it was adopted, though, the definition require-
ment became another technical challenge to forestry activities in
the CDM. In 2006, the FAO issued a working paper that specifi-
cally addressed the issue of choosing a forest definition for the
CDM. Based on criteria that would better serve the interests of a
non-Annex I Party participating in the CDM, it set forth a ten-
step procedure aimed at helping a country choose the best pa-
rameters for defining forests.2 "5 The proper selection of param-
eters directly affects the question of which areas will be eligible
for afforestation and reforestation projects, and although it
presents another technical challenge to participants and devel-
opers, it reflects the evolution of the topic.
3. Defining Baseline and Monitoring Methodologies
Baseline scenarios and monitoring methodologies are com-
plex by nature,216 but they are more difficult in the ambit of af-
forestation and reforestation activities than they are in the ambit
of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.217 The cred-
ibility of the CERs from afforestation and reforestation projects
is constantly threatened due to anthropogenic and naturally-oc-
curring phenomena that can disturb the project. 21 8 As a result,
as of the writing of this Article, there are ten approved baseline
and monitoring methodologies for afforestation and reforesta-
tion projects, 2 19 whereas there are more than sixty for energy
efficiency and renewable energy activities. 220 The complexity of
defining a baseline-scenario is reflected by the comprehensive
and technically challenging voluntary guideline provided by the
214. See Neeffet al., supra note 202, at 5-6 (discussing the array of definitions coun-
tries use for forests).
215. See id. 6-7.
216. See Swisher, supra note 30, at 72 ("Long-term monitoring of forestry and land-
use projects can also be complex.").
217. See id. at 63 ("In the case of power supply projects, the baseline can be rela-
tively clearly determined from the carbon content of the fossil fuel replaced.").
218. See IPCC SPECtAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 10.
219. See CDM: Afforestation/Reforestation Methodologies, http://cdm.unfccc.
int/methodologies/ARmethodologies/approved-ar.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
220. See Methodologies for CDM Project Activities, http://cdm.unfccc.int/meth-
odologies/PAmethodologies/approved.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2007).
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CDM Executive Board at its thirty-fifth meeting entitled Combined
Tool to Identify the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in
A/R CDM Project Activities (Version 01).221 Thus, although it is a
major technical challenge, the regulatory development of stan-
dards for determining baselines and monitoring methodologies
represents a remarkable evolution in the CDM forestry legal
framework.
4. Non-Permanence/Reversibility and Leakage
Two additional technical challenges typical to forestry pro-
ject activities are permanence 222 and leakage .223 According to
the IPCC's 2000 special report on LULUCF, project developers
failed to address non-permanence 224 and leakage. 225 Almost five
years later, at COP-9 in Milan, the forestry legal framework
evolved by expressly incorporating leakage, as long as it can be
measured and attributable to the forestry project activity.2 2 6 As
to the reversibility issue, also at COP-9, the Parties adopted one
of the IPCC's recommendations and imposed a minimum credit-
ing period of twenty years (with the possibility of being renewed
twice) and a maximum crediting period of thirty years (without
the option to renew)227
Different from other types of CDM activities, credits
("CERs") from afforestation and reforestation projects enjoy a
limited lifetime and are divided into "temporary" ("tCER") and
"long-term" ("ICER"), due to the ephemeral nature of terrestrial
carbon sinks.2 28 The difference between them being that a tCER
221. See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism,
Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty
Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: Combined Tool to Identify the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate
Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 01), U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,
2007).
222. The term permanence refers to "[t]he longevity of a carbon pool." IPCC SPE-
ciAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 21.
223. The term leakage is defined as "the increase in greenhouse gas emissions by
sources which occurs outside the boundary of an afforestation or reforestation project
activity under the CDM which is measurable and attributable to the afforestation or
reforestation project activity." COP-9 Report - Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9
Annex, 1(e).
224. See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 9.
225. See id. at 14.
226. See COP-9 Report - Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9 Annex, I 1 (e).
227. See id. Decision 19/CP.9 Annex, 23.
228. See id. 1 16.
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"expires at the end of the commitment period following the one
during which it was issued" and a ICER "expires at the end of
crediting period of the afforestation or reforestation project ac-
tivity under the CDM for which it was issued.22 9 Upon expira-
tion, tCERs and ICERs have to be replaced by new CERs. There-
fore, the risk of non-permanence was resolved by this economic
model with the downside being a complex system of oversight.230
C. Environmental Impacts
According to the IPCC's 2000 special report on LULUCF,
forestry projects in the CDM "aiming to mitigate climate change
may provide socio-economic and environmental benefits prima-
rily within project boundaries, although they may also pose risks
of negative impacts."23 1 These impacts can be environmental,
socio-economic, and cultural in nature.
1. Conversion of Forested Areas into Plantations,
Grazing Land and Agricultural Land
The expansion of allowable forestry activities could en-
courage the replacement of mature forests by fast-growing tree
plantations, which have higher rates of carbon sequestration.3 2
Although limited to afforestation and reforestation projects, the
risks are diminished because of the definitions these activities
are given by the climate change regime. 233 The rationale for es-
tablishing a historical baseline is to avoid deforestation of ma-
ture forests for subsequent re-growth for CDM carbon credit
21t4purposes.
On the other hand, if the CDM legal framework is properly
229. Id.
230. See VAN KOOTEN, supra note 56, at 92-96 (presenting three alternative eco-
nomic models to address the issue of non-permanence).
231. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT oN LULUCF, supra note 18, at 15.
232. SeeJanine Bloomfield & Holly L. Pearson, Land use, Land-use Change, Forestry,
and Agricultural Activities in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates of Greenhouse Gas
Offset Potential, 5 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 9, 12 (2000).
233. See COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision ll/CP.7 An-
nex, I 1 (b)-(c) (defining both afforestation and reforestation as the human-induced
conversion of non-forested areas into forested areas, but presupposing that the con-
verted land had not been forested for at least fifty years and presupposing that refores-
tation involves the conversion of those areas that were not forested on December 31,
1989).
234. See Bloomfield & Pearson, supra note 232, at 12.
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used (which appears to be the case),235 it can provide the means
for avoiding harmful conversions. One possibility for subse-
quent commitment periods would be the inclusion of accounta-
bility for the carbon emissions associated with deforestation
practices before any forested land is replaced with, and/or con-
verted into, fast-growing tree plantations. 236 Another possibility
is allowing for forest preservation and conservation projects
under the CDM.23 7 Mature forests do not have the same seques-
tration potentials, but they have great carbon storage poten-
tials.23 8 Credits, therefore, could be conferred upon carbon stor-
age in the form of "avoided emissions." In this case, though,
some degree of flexibility with respect to the "human-induced"
criterion would have to be provided. 23 9
In any event, preserving the role of the CDM Executive
Board and strengthening the CDM forestry legal framework are
necessary requirements for expanding the list of permissible
LULUCF activities in future commitment periods.
2. Biodiversity
The impacts on biodiversity have the potential to be cata-
strophic. However, if the climate change regime allows for for-
est conservation projects, biodiversity stands to benefit consider-
ably.240 Therefore, rather than representing an obstacle that
needs overcoming, the climate change legal regime can be seen
as an important tool that is available to different stakeholders
involved in biodiversity conservation.
3. Natural Ecosystems
CDM forestry project activities also have the potential to im-
pact natural ecosystems, both positively and negatively. The in-
235. See IMgi & Sch6ne, supra note 163, at 11-13 (outlining the demanding proce-
dure for the approval of new methodologies under the CDM).
236. See Bloomfield & Pearson, supra note 232, at 12.
237. See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 77, at 29 (arguing against limiting forestry
projects to afforestation and reforestation activities).
238. See Bloomfield & Pearson, supra note 232, at 12.
239. See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 57, at 79 (implying that some Parties at the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations did not want to confer credits for activities that were naturally
occurring).
240. See Moura-Costa & Stuart, supra note 45, at 235 (arguing that if investment in
forest management regimes continues, a huge infusion of new capital in the forestry
sector will result, benefiting the conservation of biodiversity).
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troduction of alien species, 24' increases in erosion processes, 2 4 2
and adverse impacts on water supplies are among the potential
threats posed by forestry projects to natural ecosystems. 24  An
SBSTA synthesis report on projects undertaken in the AIJ Pilot
Phase identified positive impacts on natural ecosystems, such as
improvements in water quality and reductions in the erosion of
hydrological resources.2 4 4 It is worth noting that the same provi-
sions in the climate change legal regime designed to protect bi-
odiversity are extended to the protection of natural ecosys-
tems.
2 4 5
4. Leakage
In addition to constituting a technical challenge for the im-
plementation of forestry projects, leakage has the potential to
adversely impact the environment. 246 Consider the hypothetical
where a reforestation project is undertaken in a degraded piece
of pasture land. If the conversion of the pasture land into for-
ested area leads to the practice of deforestation elsewhere for
the creation of new grazing land, the deforested area faces sig-
nificant environmental impacts.
D. Socio-Economic Impacts
An analysis of the socio-economic impacts is required when-
ever the host country or the project participants deem them rele-
vant. 247 For the purposes of this Section, socio-economic im-
241. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 423 n.6 (noting the fierce debate over allowing
invasive species (also known as alien, exotic, or non-indigenous species) to be used in
CDM reforestation projects).
242. See Robert J. Zomer et al., Carbon, Land and Water: A Global Analysis of the
Hydrologic Dimensions of Climate Change Mitigation through Afforestation/Reforestation 3 (In-
ternational Water Management Institute, Research Report No. 101, 2006).
243. See id. at 3-5.
244. See 1997 SBSTA Report, supra note 100, 28.
245. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference ofthe Par-
ties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First
Session, Decision 5/CMP.1 Annex, 12(c), U.N. Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1
(Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two].
246. See IPCC SPECiAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 11. But see IPCC
SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, at 11 (listing the demonstration effect of
new management approaches and technology adoption as positive leakage).
247. See COP/MOP-1 Report - Part Two, supra note 245, Decision 5/CMP.1 Annex,
12(c).
2008]
676 FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.31:634
pacts of forestry projects are examined in light of capacity-build-
ing related to employment opportunities and/or job losses,
international trade, financial return to local entities, and public
and private forestry subsidies.
1. Capacity-building and the Transfer of Sound Technology
Due to the complexities of the CDM with respect to for-
estry,2 48 the consequent demand for highly qualified technical
personnel, and the implementation of new technologies, for-
estry projects in developing countries could lead to job losses or
increased employment opportunities for personnel from devel-
oped countries. 249 However, the involvement of local communi-
ties is essentially a requirement for the achievement of the de-
sired positive effects in these types of project activities.250 Conse-
quently, based on information from the AIJ Pilot Phase, forestry
activities will significantly increase capacity-building and employ-
ment opportunities in developing countries, as well as benefit
local communities through the transfer of new sound technolo-
gies. 5
1
2. International Trade
Presumably, only "[p] rojects affecting the supply of timber
products or consumption of energy services, for example, can
affect price signals for the rest of the market, potentially
counteracting a portion of the calculated benefits of the original
project."252 Although non-permanence may be an issue, 253 for-
248. See Bloomfield & Pearson, supra note 232, at 21 ("Land-use decisions are com-
plex, however, and are based on many conflicting economic, social, political, and envi-
ronmental factors in addition to the amount of carbon that could be credited for a
particular project.").
249. See Michaelowa, supra note 93, at 206 ("A possible barrier to CDM projects
can be a requirement that projects shall not lead to job losses. Any modern technology
will displace workers due to its more efficient character. However, often more jobs are
created through the development effects induced by the use of the new technology.
Thus a rigid job loss criterion only looking at the project itself is likely to prevent most
CDM projects.").
250. SeeJanine Bloomfield et al., Land-Use Change and Forestry in the Kyoto Protocol, 5
MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 3, 6 (2000) ("[F] or projects to
be conceived of, designed, and successfully implemented, stakeholder support, both by
project funders and by the host countries and local communities, is crucial.").
251. See 1997 SBSTA Report, supra note 100, 28 (reproducing socio-economic
benefits reported by the Parties).
252. See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 77, at 39.
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estry projects generate timber products that did not exist in the
first place. This means that currently allowed afforestation and
reforestation activities will have little or no effect on interna-
tional trade-including the existing timber market.254 Nonethe-
less, harmonized policies and actions between the climate
change regime and other international forest forums are
strongly recommended outcomes for the upcoming discussions
regarding whether or not to allow for other LULUCF activities,
such as forest conservation and management. 255
3. Local Participation and Financial Return
to Local Stakeholders
Any potential interference with the needs of local stakehold-
ers caused by a CDM forestry activity must not only be properly
assessed, 256 but generate enough income to offset eventual
losses. Even before tighter regulations on modalities and proce-
dures for forestry projects in the CDM were promulgated at
COP-9 in 2004,257 the IPCC had indicated that enabling local
stakeholders to share the financial benefits of CDM forestry ac-
tivities was a necessary social condition.25' A significant regula-
tory step towards the implementation of a framework that could
effectively embrace profitability for local participants was the
253. See COP-9Report -Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9, pmbl. (recogniz-
ing the problem of non-permanence).
254. See Karen Alvarenga & Amber Moreen, Positive Incentives to Reduce Emissions
from Deforestation, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. ON THE SIDE, May 9, 2007, at 4 (2007),
http://www.iisd.ca/climate/sb26/enbots/pdf/enbots1221e.pdf (reporting that Brazil
had "accounted for the production of timber in a sustainable way to meet demand for
such products").
255. One writer, however, is skeptical that harmonized policies and actions are
possible, at least with respect to CDM projects involving genetically modified (GM)
trees. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 444-45 (2006) ("The International Tropical Tim-
ber Agreement ("ITT'A") will not apply to CDM projects. The ITTA aims to ensure that
all tropical timber products traded internationally originate in sustainably managed for-
ests .... [O]ther potentially applicable agreements-like the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITIES") or the FAG
Tropical Forestry Action Plan-will most likely never apply to GM tree reforestation
projects."). Other writers are more optimistic. See Alvarenga & Moreen, supra note 254,
at 4 (referring to sustainable forestry activities as a way of mitigating the adverse effects
of forest conservation and management projects on the international timber market).
256. See COP/MOP-1 Report - Part Two, supra note 245, Decision 5/CMP.1, 12(c)
(providing for a socio-economic impact assessment in case a preliminary analysis indi-
cates the potential for adverse socio-economic impacts).
257. See COP-9 Report - Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9.
258. See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF, supra note 18, 90.
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provision for small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects
targeting low-income communities and individuals.259
Although the international legal framework is already in
place, the practice is still incipient.26 ° The challenges for up-
coming commitment periods include: considerations of profit
sharing in forest management and conservation projects; local
participation in the decision-making process at all levels (from
project conception to project implementation and manage-
ment) ;261 and the harmonization of domestic policies and mea-
sures with the international legal framework so as to allow local
communities to benefit from forestry activities. 262
4. Domestic CDM Forestry Subsidies
A domestic CDM forestry subsidy scheme that is harmo-
nized with the climate change legal framework is a powerful in-
centive for current afforestation and reforestation projects and
other LULUCF activities that might eventually be added for up-
coming commitment periods. This harmonization should start
with the elimination of conflicting domestic subsidies, as the Par-
ties directed at COP/MOP-1. 263 An example is domestic legisla-
tion penalizing forest conservation and promoting land clear-
ance (deforestation) for agricultural purposes and urban
sprawl.2 64
259. See COP-9 Report - Part Two, supra note 85, Decision 19/CP.9 Annex, I(i)
("'Small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM' are
those that are expected to result in net anthropogenic greenhouse gas removals by
sinks of less than 8 kilotonnes of CO 2 per year and are developed or implemented by
low-income communities and individuals as determined by the host Party.").
260. See UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, http://cdmpipeline.
org/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (listing 1666 CDM projects that are "at
validation" and 154 that are "in the process of registration").
261. Cf Schwartz, supra note 86, at 480 (recommending that local stakeholders be
given the opportunity to comment on projects that may threaten biodiversity).
262. See Sagemoaller, supra note 13, at 236 ("Domestic legal regimes may allow indi-
vidual landowners to generate credits from LULUCF activities that may be traded on
the international market.").
263. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol at its First Session, Decision 31/CMP.1, 8, U.N. Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/
Add.4 (Mar. 30, 2006).
264. See Steven A. Kennett, Carbon Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol: Legal and Policy Mech-
anisms for Domestic Implementation, 21 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 252, 273 (2003).
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It is worth noting that public subsidies are not limited to
offering financial support. They might take the form of direct
payments in cash, goods, or services to forest landowners for pro-
moting carbon sequestration; purchases of land or land inter-
ests; or implementation of general forest management service
programs.265  Thus, national public subsidies concerning
LULUCF activities should be planned in accordance with the in-
ternational legal framework and other domestic subsidies for
forest management generally.
IV. OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES TO, AND ADVERSE
IMPACTS OF, FOREST AND FORESTRY PROJECT A CTIVITIES
UNDER THE CDM FOR UPCOMING COMMITMENT PERIODS
In general, if well-managed and implemented, project-based
forest and forestry activities in the CDM, beyond just afforesta-
tion and reforestation practices, can serve many environmental,
social, and economic purposes and benefit small, rural, and
poor communities and individuals. The positive aspects of for-
estry activities can overcome political, legal, and technical chal-
lenges; the risks to biodiversity and watersheds; and the promo-
tion of deforestation. This section, then, is dedicated to examin-
ing trends and proposing actions for future commitment
periods.
A. Overcoming Political and Legal Obstacles
U.S. resistance to the Kyoto Protocol may be overcome once
a new administration comes to power. The 2006 elections in the
United States saw the Democrats take the majority from the
Republicans, which might indicate a Democratic victory in the
2008 presidential election. In view of Democratic sensibilities
with respect to climate change, and the fact that the Clinton Ad-
ministration signed the Kyoto Protocol but faced a Republican
Congress, one could see how the United States is much more
likely to ratify the Protocol.266
On the other hand, two factors indicate that the EU will not
easily accept forestry activities in the CDM in future commitment
265. See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 19, at 46.
266. SeeJusTs & FLETCHER, supra note 188, at 11 (implying that, contrary to the
Bush administration, the Clinton administration demonstrated an affinity towards the
international climate change legal regime).
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periods. The EU's refusal to accept credits from forestry activi-
ties in the ETS is the first clear indication.267 In addition, should
the afforestation and reforestation limitation be overcome in the
CDM for future commitment periods, the language used in the
ETS suggests that it is not likely that the EU will accept the ex-
pansion of allowable activities.268 Instead of using just the terms
afforestation and reforestation in the ETS, legislators used the
phrase LULUCF,2 6 9 which indicates that the EU anticipated fu-
ture attempts to broaden the scope of forestry projects in the
CDM and opted to exclude all forestry projects in advance.
Prospects are better for the CDM's current limitation on
forestry activities to afforestation and reforestation projects. De-
cision 11/CP.7 provides that the limitation is valid for only the
first commitment period and that the Parties should decide
upon new LULUCF activities for upcoming commitment peri-
ods.2 7
0
B. A Stronger Link Between the Climate Change Legal Regime and
Other Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements
As far as CDM forestry activities are concerned, in light of
environmental, social, and political implications arising interna-
tionally from the climate change debate, it is crucial that the le-
gal regime create links beyond those envisioned between the Li-
aison Group and the Rio Conventions.271 Following the exam-
267. See KENNETH M. CHOMITZ ET AL., WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW: AT LOGGERHEADS?
AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE TROPICAL
FORESTS 23 (2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTrROPICAL
FOREST/Resources/2463822-1161184206155/3060670-1161608416166/PRR-ALSA
Overviewwebnonembargo.pdf ("[S]ome observers think that tackling climate change
requires paying about US$3 a ton for CO2 abatement-and European Union (EU)
members are currently paying up to US$20 a ton (though this price is volatile). In
other words, deforesters are destroying a carbon storage asset theoretically worth
US$1,500-US$10,000 to create a pasture worth US$200-US$500 (per hectare). Yet car-
bon markets, such as those under the Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, do not reward forestholders for reduced emissions from avoided deforesta-
tion.").
268. See Sagemfiller, supra note 13, at 233 (noting that the EU's decision not to
recognize credits for LULUCF activities is premised on the fact that forestry credits can
be obtained at relatively low prices, reducing emissions allowances prices and inhibiting
domestic action aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions).
269. See Council Directive No. 2004/101/EC, art. 1, 2004 O.J. L 338, at 18, 21.
270. See COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume I), supra note 47, Decision I1/CP.7 An-
nex, 14-15.
271. Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, New Delhi, India, Oct. 23-
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pie set by the FAO,2 7 2 stronger communications channels ought
to be opened with the World Bank and the International Labor
Organization on the potential implications and benefits of for-
estry activities on employment conditions and opportunities.273
The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity has
also provided a paradigm to be followed in the socio-economic
area by developing a specific study on the relationship between
biological diversity and climate change. 27 4 Firmer institutional
cooperation beyond interconnected environmental areas would
help prevent poor social conditions, such as the ones threaten-
ing the credibility of CDM biofuels and biomass project activi-
ties.2 7
5
C. Environmental and Socio-Economic Impact
Analyses and Assessments
The importance of environmental and socio-economic im-
pact assessments is doubtless. Nonetheless, two major factors ap-
pear to limit the power of climate change negotiators to go be-
yond merely requiring preliminary analysis instead of an impact
assessment. The first one is a legal limitation. Article 21 of the
1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment clearly states that countries have the sover-
eign right to exploit their own natural resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies. 276 In addition, Principle 17 of
Nov. 1, 2002, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighth Session - Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session, Decision 13/CP.8, 1, U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 (Mar. 28, 2003) (affirming the need for enhanced coopera-
tion between the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification).
272. See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 19, at 31 (taking into consideration the
benefits and pitfalls of markets as tools for the encouragement of mitigation activities).
273. See 1997 SBSTA Report, supra note 100, 1 28 (listing improved working envi-
ronments, increased economic opportunities, and the development of local production
capacity as potential benefits arising from jointly implemented activities).
274. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIvERSiTY, INTERLINKAGES
BETWEEN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITv AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ADVICE ON THE INTEGRATION OF
BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENnON ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS KYOTO PROTOCOL 48 (2003),
available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-ts-10.pdf.
275. See Press Release, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, IDB Targets $3 Billion in Private Sec-
tor Biofuel Projects (Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articlede-
tail.cfm?artid=3779&language=En (announcing investments in ethanol and biofuels
production while closely examining questions regarding labor conditions).
276. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
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the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, while
embracing environmental impact assessments, establishes that
they shall be conducted only when the proposed activity is likely
to adversely impact the environment.277
The second factor seems to be of a policy nature. That is,
the whole validation, verification, and certification process for
afforestation and reforestation projects is already overly burden-
some, bureaucratic, time consuming, and replete with high pro-
cedural costs. Adding an environmental and social-economic
impact assessment for those projects that, at first, do not present
the risk for any adverse impacts would make CDM forestry activi-
ties practically unfeasible in light of the aforementioned legal,
political, and technical obstacles already apparent.278
D. Good Governance: Education, Training, Public Awareness, Land
Tenure, Transparency and Domestic Accountability
Good governance in CDM forestry can be achieved by sup-
porting domestic legislation that enhances the role of sinks in
the climate change legal regime. 27' Legislation could be aimed
at, inter alia, combating corruption, regulating ownership and
management of public forested areas, reconciling the interests
of private owners (land tenure), promoting education, providing
training and public awareness, and ensuring transparency. 2 0
The positive interaction of the aforementioned socio-economic
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972) ("States have, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental policies .... ").
277. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle
17, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992) ("Environmental impact assess-
ment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are
likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a
decision of a competent national authority.").
278. See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 77, at 35 ("Overly detailed reviews of envi-
ronmental impacts could require the equivalent of an environmental impact statement.
Such a process could prove so expensive that it would impede the ability to prepare and
fund projects.").
279. See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 19, at 53 ("Having a legal foundation for
forest [greenhouse gas] mitigation projects will enable forests to play a positive role in
UNFCCC compliance.").
280. See CHoMrrz ET AL., supra note 267, at 19-22 (providing policy recommenda-
tions for maximizing forest management and conservation while reducing poverty).
SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREATIES
elements with forestry practices is crucial for overcoming the ob-
stacles and challenges CDM forestry activities will face in future
commitment periods.2"'
CONCLUSION
Forest and forestry projects in the CDM were extremely con-
troversial during the climate change negotiations, and as a re-
sult, they were limited to afforestation and reforestation prac-
tices. The main concerns included the difficulty of monitoring
forest and forestry activities; the hampering of stronger domestic
mitigation action because they provided cheap carbon credits;
and the fear that they would lead to deforestation.
However, CDM forest and forestry projects can provide ben-
efits that trump their adverse effects. If there is flexibility on a
human-induced requirement for future commitment periods,
forest conservation projects can help foster biodiversity and, if
sustainable, provide positive revenue alternatives for local com-
munities.
In order for that to occur, though, current obstacles, such
as the United States' refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the
EU's refusal to accept CDM LULUCF credits, and the legal limi-
tation on allowable practices, must be overcome. At the same
time, technical challenges, including additionality, defining
baseline and monitoring methodologies, choosing a domestic
definition for forests, and overseeing issues of non-permanence
and leakage, are necessary for ensuring the positive outcomes of
forestry projects and softening resistance for upcoming commit-
ment periods.
281. See id. at 22 ("While forests have many environmental benefits, only two com-
mand a global constituency with potentially large willingness to pay for those benefits:
carbon storage and conservation of globally significant biodiversity. Mobilizing global
finance for these environmental services is a crucial long-term challenge.").
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